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Abstract  
We attempt in this paper to estimate the impact of the endowment of natural resources, 
particularly oil rent, as well as the impact of the quality of institutions, on the level of public 
spending in Algeria. Our purpose is to test, by the application of an econometric estimation 
(OLS and 2SLS), the significance of the variable oil rent and the variables indicating the 
institutional quality of public expenditure management. Moreover, it was interesting to add 
the interaction term between rent and the variables indicating the quality of the institutions to 
see the indirect and common effect on the dependent variable. 
The results of the estimation show that the impact of natural rent is greater than the impact of 
oil rent on both components of public spending: equipment expenses and operational 
expenses. Thus, we see that there is no proportional relationship between rent and public 
spending. In regards of the institutional quality, the results show that the budgetary 
procedures lack transparency with the presence of rent, because the benefits related to the 
exercise of power are more important, which encourage politicians to manipulate the 
composition of public expenditure to maximize their likelihood to make decisions.  This result 
is argued by the positive relation between spending and respectively the level of financial risk, 
and the level of economic risk.  Positive relationship between public spending and the measure 
of political risk shows that the current government increases spending to avoid conflicts and 
manifestations of the population. However, the interaction effect between rent and 
institutional quality measures on spending is negative, indicating that the presence of rent in 
less democrat countries like Algeria increases expenditure. This indicates that the positive 
public spending effects diminish as institutional quality improves. 
 
Keywords: Natural Resources, Oil rent, Public spending, Institutional Quality. 
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Introduction  
 
          Many countries are counted among the most endowed in terms of natural 
resources, oil and gas are the most significant examples. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to insure a good management of this wealth so that the wealth constitutes a vector of 
growth and economic development. 
 
Algeria is among the dependent countries in natural resources where the oil tax 
system occupies an important place in all government revenues. However, following 
the oil crisis of 1998, when the price of a barrel reached eighteen (18) dollars, the 
government made the decision in 2000 to establish a Revenue Regulation Fund (FRR) 
(Barka, 2009) in the form of an account of special affectation, with the aim to protect 
public spending from the negative effects of volatility and unpredictability in oil prices 
in international markets. 
 
 
 
What is the impact of the endowment in natural resources and the quality of 
institutions on the management of the public spending in Algeria? 
 
To answer this question, we use an econometric study inspired by the works of 
Rabah Arezki and Thorvaldur Gylfason (2011), and Louis-Marie Philippot (2008). We 
show the degree of significance of the relationship between total rent, oil rent, quality 
of institutions, and the components of public spending. We start with a brief review of 
the literature on a subject of the study. Then we present an empirical analysis which 
includes a description of the variables used and the econometric model. After, we 
present the results and our comments. Finally, we feature the conclusion and future 
prospects of the study. 
 
1- Literature  
 
         There are numerous studies which have examined the relationship between 
resource rent, quality of institutions, growth and public spending. Starting with the 
literature on natural resources and its impact on the economic growth, we look to 
Frederik Van der Ploeg (2010) and his paper " Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?" 
He identifies a variety of hypotheses and elements of proofs on the dependence of 
natural resources. At first, he presented the hypotheses supporting the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate according to important volumes of natural resources, 
deindustrialization, and bad growth perspectives. He considered that these effects are 
most recurrent in countries characterized by bad institutional quality, the absence of 
law, corruption, presidential democracies, and undeveloped financial systems.  
 
         On the other hand, the author exposed the assumptions assuming the presence 
of resources enhances "rent seeking" and is accompanied by bad quality of institutions, 
thus leading to corruption in non-democratic countries. Dutch disease and 
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deindustrialization are among the explanations (Corden & Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984) 
of the resource curse. In fact, wealth due to the export of natural resources leads to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, resulting in the contraction of the commercial 
sector (Neary & Corden, 1982; Corden, 1984). This illustrates, along with the Salter-
Swan (1959-1960) model of two-sector economy, a resource windfall: abstracting from 
capital accumulation, international investment, and financial assets. Moreover, Salter-
Swan developed for small economies  a dependent or Scandinavian economic model, 
(Salter, 1959; Swan 1960; Aukrust 1960). The supply of non-tradable goods is positively 
related to the real exchange rate. Indeed, a real depreciation of the domestic currency 
stimulates an increased supply of tradable goods (via improved price competitiveness) 
to the detriment of the supply of non-tradable goods.  
 
         In addition, Van der Ploeg cited some empirical studies on the Dutch disease 
effects. The most important is the pioneering study by Sachs and Warner (1995), which 
explains the average real GDP growth per capita over the period 1970-1990 because of 
natural resources. This study shows that there is a significant negative effect of 
resource dependence (measured by the share of primary exports of GNP in 1970) on 
growth. 
 
         In another study about the relationship between natural resource rents, 
democracy and growth, Paul Callier and Anke Hoeffler (2007), started with a simple 
model of democratic politics in which they distinguish two dimensions of democracy: 
electoral competition and control. The authors used in the regression analysis eight 
sub-periods: 1970-1973, 1974-1977... 1998-2001. They successfully build a panel of 969 
observations. The results show that in developing countries, the combination of rent 
and the low level of democracy have negatively affected growth. 
 
        The work of Rabah Arezki and Thorvaldur Gylfason (2011) examined the effect of 
the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption and internal 
conflict,  presenting an empirical study with an econometric approach based on the 
dynamic panel data on a sample of 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 
1985-2007. The results suggest that good political institutions by limiting the power of 
executives diminished  the negative effect of resource rents on corruption. On the other 
hand, the weakness of the political institutions increases the impact of resource rents 
on corruption. In parallel, the increase in resource rent leads to more (less) government 
spending in countries that are less (more) democratic. The term of interaction between 
resource rents and Polity2 (democracy) score on corruption is significant and 
quantitatively important. In general, the results show that the mechanisms by which 
the rent resources influence the corruption cannot be separated from political systems.  
 
         Concerning institutional quality, the economic historians such as North and 
Thomas (1973) provided the first accounts of their critical role. But what do we mean 
by institutions? According to Douglas North (1990), institutions are the game rules in 
a society or more formally, the humanly designed constraints that share human 
interaction. They structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or 
economic. However, legal institutions as a subset of the overall institutional 
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framework can be defined as the rules that govern trade relations between the different 
agents of society, businesses, households and government (Beck 2010).  
 
         Many economic studies in recent years suggest that institutions are necessary for 
economic development and growth. Indeed, in societies with institutions that are 
qualified bad in terms of management, politicians adopt unsustainable policies to 
satisfy different groups and stay in power (Acemoglu et al.  2002). Discovering later 
what are the measures of institutional quality, we distinguish the indicators of the 
governance of corruption, bureaucracy, rights and orders (Matthias Busse and Steffen 
Groning (2011). Other measures outlined in a study by Daniel Kaufman, Art and Pablo 
Kaay-Zoid Lobation 1999 are i.) the overall index of governance which is an average 
calculated based on six variables; namely 1) citizen participation and accountability - 
possibility for citizens to choose their leaders, to enjoy civil and political rights and to 
have an independent press; 2) political stability and absence of violence - the 
probability that a state will not be overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means; 
(3) effectiveness of public authorities - quality of public service delivery and 
competence and political independence of the public service; 4) regulatory burdens - 
relative lack of state regulation of product markets, the banking system and foreign 
trade; (5) rule of law - protection of persons and property against violence and theft, 
independence and efficiency of the judiciary and respect for contracts; 6) absence of 
corruption - no abuse of power for the benefit of private interests, (ii) property rights, 
and (iii) control of the executive power.  
 
         These measures themselves are not objective; they are subjective assessments and 
assessments of national experts or population assessments in surveys carried out by 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations. 
 
           Natural resources would prevent the development of "good" institutions 
conducive to economic development. If institutions are a factor of economic 
development, it is important to understand the determinants of institutional quality. 
A number of studies have been carried out (La Porta et al., 1998; Chong & Zonforlin, 
2000; Islam & Montenegro, 2002; Rigobon & Rodrik, 2004; Siba, 2008) A number of 
important variables such as income, latitude, ethnic fragmentation, religious 
affiliation, openness, inequality, schooling or legal origin are mentioned. These 
variables are used later as instruments for the explanation of the institutions. 
 
         About the public spending and resource rents, Louis-Marie Philippot in 2008, 
examined in a working paper the relationship between natural rent and composition 
of public spending, by maintaining the arguments of the politico-budgetary cycle 
model Drazen and Eslava (2005a). He estimated a fixed effects model in order to 
explain the part of a category of expenditure in total public spending by number of 
variables, rent, and other control variables. The results show that the presence of rent 
is associated with an increase in current expenditures including subsidies. However, 
the existence of natural rent has no significant impact on the share of capital 
expenditure. 
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2- Rent, Institutional Quality and Public Spending in Algeria: An Empirical 
Analysis  
 
2.1. Description of the Variables: 
 
         In this study the dependent variables are both components of public spending: 
equipment spending and operational expenses. The data relative to these two variables 
arise from bases compiled by the head office (executive management) of the Algerian 
Treasury (Ministry of Finance). We use logarithms to simplify the data.  
 
         Since the work of Sachs and Warner (1995), natural endowment is generally 
measured by primary exports in total exports or as a percentage of GDP. This indicator 
tends to measure the effect of concentration of exports, more than the effect of natural 
resources (Brunnschweiler, 2008). Here we use the measure of the natural wealth of a 
country, "the natural rent" compiled by the World Bank (World Development 
Indicators), as well as the measure of oil exports(OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 
2016). 
 
         We therefore use three different measures between natural rent, oil rent and oil 
exports from World Development Indicators (WDI) 17 February, 2016 and OPEC 
Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016: 
Table 1: Independent Variables; Measures of Rent 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Rent (% GDP) Total Naturel Rent is the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents, minerals rents and 
forest rents. 
Rents    = natural resource price – extraction 
costs  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 17 
February, 2016 
Oil rent 
(%GDP) 
Oil rent World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 17 
February, 2016 
Log oil_export Oil exportation OPEC Annual 
Statistical Bulletin 2016 
Source: Developed by the authors 
 
         In addition, we use to measure institutional quality, three variables compiled by 
using data from the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide), which in total contains 
22 variables in three set of categories: political, economic, and financial risk, starting in 
1984. These data have been extensively used in the literature on the effects of 
institutions and, in particular they are the data underling the composite measure of 
« Institutional Quality » used in Mehlum et al 2006 and Boschini et al 2007. Moreover, 
the methodology of ICRG is regularly used by researchers of the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund).   
 
         We are essentially interested in the three measures: economic risk rating, financial 
risk rating that refers to the role of law and legal institutions (Beck,2010) and political 
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risk rating with respect to the rules and the level of democracy (Busse & Groning 2011) 
as well as Kaufman, et. al.  (1999). These variables are presented with a score from 0 to 
100. 
 
         The choice of these variables is argued by the compatibility of the data with the 
use of other variables in other case studies of Algeria. These three measures are 
presented as follows: 
Table 2: Institutional Quality Measures 
Variables Definition Data Source  
E risk All the risks of origins associated with the 
economic activity of companies. The risks can 
include external risks to a company such as the 
political risk, or risk of inflation, but also risks 
specific to the company such as operational risk. 
ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide)  
F risk The risk of losing money due to financial 
transactions (financial assets) or economic 
transactions with financial implications such as 
currency risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk ... etc. 
ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) 
P risk Entails the risk of emergence of conflicts, terrorism, 
respect for the rule of law and regulatory and 
commercial environments. 
ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) 
Source: Developed by the authors. 
 
         In our econometric study, we introduced a control vector of variables X. These 
control variables are presented as follows: 
 
Table 3: Control Variables 
Variable Definition Data Source 
TI (% GDP) Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current 
local currency over GDP. Investment or gross 
capital formation is measured by the total value 
of gross fixed capital formation, and changes in 
inventories and acquisitions less disposals of 
valuables for a unit or sector. [SNA 1993] 
FMI (World 
Economic Outlook 
Database, 2016) 
GNS (%GDP) Expressed as a ratio of gross national savings in 
current local currency and GDP in current local 
currency. Gross national saving is gross 
disposable income less final consumption 
expenditure after taking account an adjustment 
for pension funds [SNA 1993]. For many 
countries, the estimates of national saving are 
built up from national accounts data on gross 
domestic investment and from balances of 
payments-based data on net foreign investment. 
FMI (World 
Economic Outlook 
Database, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
Import Bs et S    
(% of GDP) 
The volume of imports of goods and services to 
GDP. 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI, 
2016) 
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Source: Developed by the authors. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Obs 
LDE 5.761409 5.774334 7.821619 3.644666 1.500577 31 
LDF 6.506523 6.752492 8.472747 3.957188 1.412602 31 
OIL_EXPO 8.251196 8.226088 8.660415 7.942504 0.212133 31 
OIL_RENT 18.19504 16.93440 31.90631 6.740223 6.961649 31 
PRISK 54.20696 56.08333 64.25000 41.42000 7.404375 31 
PRIX_BARIL 53.55930 38.46318 117.2294 18.48974 30.65020 31 
RESERVE 10.03402 10.05362 10.08884 9.932677 0.055861 31 
GNS 36.85158 34.53300 57.49400 20.16800 11.47309 31 
IMP_BS_ET_S 25.69919 24.90000 36.00000 18.40000 3.831824 31 
E_RISK 34.76667 35.25000 45.08000 25.75000 6.819384 31 
F_RISK 38.13723 36.67000 49.00000 23.58000 9.011400 31 
TI 32.03684 29.83700 49.05100 22.44000 7.624670 31 
TEMP 23.84845 24.15000 25.00104 21.75417 0.920435 31 
   Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
2.2. Econometric Model and Methodology 
 
         The study focuses on the case of Algeria which is among the most endowed 
countries with natural resources, and is where oil taxation has an important place in 
all government revenues. With regard to the period of analysis we are constrained by 
the availability of data on institutional quality, so we work over the period 1985-2015. 
         We proceed to econometric estimation to test the significance of the variables 
used. The model takes the following forms: 
𝒅𝒑𝒕   =  ∝  +𝜷𝟏  𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑸𝑰𝒕  + 𝜷𝟑  𝑿𝒕  + 𝜺𝒕 …. (1) 
𝒅𝒑𝒕  =   𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒕  + 𝜷𝟐𝑸𝑰𝒕  +  𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒  (𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∗ 𝑸𝑰𝒕) +  𝜺𝒕… (2) 
          The variable dpt  is the share of the various components of public spending. Our 
variable of interest is the total natural rent, the oil rent and the oil export. 𝑸𝑰𝒕 is the 
quality of institutions measured by three variables: economic risk, financial risk and 
political risk. X is the vector of control variables, and (rent*QI) is the term of 
interaction. 
2.3. OLS Results: 
 
         For each category of expenditure, we estimate three models by integrating in turn 
the different variables of interest: rent measures and institutional quality (see the tables 
of results). 
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Table 5: Equipment Spending, Institutional Quality and Rent 
With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses, we give the standard 
deviations. Source: Developed by the authors.  
 
Table 6: Operational Expenditure, Institutional Quality, and Rent 
With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses we give the standard 
deviations. Source: Developed by the authors.  
 
Variables Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model  
(3) 
Variables Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
rente 0.04 
(0.02)* 
0.004 
(0.015) 
0.05 
(0.02)* 
Oil rent 0.067 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
E risk 0.04 
(0.021)* 
  
 
E risk 0.06 
(0.02)* 
  
F risk  0.13 
(0.019)* 
 F risk  0.13 
(0.017)* 
 
P risk  
 
 -0.018 
(0.01) 
P risk   -0.02 
  (0.01)* 
TI 0.13 
(0.021)* 
0.05 
(0.018)* 
0.11 
(0.02)* 
TI 0.10 
(0.02)* 
0.05 
(0.01)* 
0.09 
(0.027)* 
GNS 0.004 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
0.02 
(0.023) 
GNS -0.0003 
(0.02) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.06 
(0.023)* 
Impor Bs et 
S 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
-0.043 
(0.016)* 
0.016 
(0.037) 
 
Impor Bs 
et S 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.01)* 
0.039 
(0.04) 
R2 Ajusted 0.90 0.95 0.89 R2 
Ajusted 
0.90 0.95 0.87 
Variables Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Variables Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Rent 0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.035)* 
Oil rent 0.048 
(0.03) 
-0.0008 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.03)* 
E risk 0.11 
(0.02)* 
  E risk 0.08 
(0.02)* 
  
F risk  0.20 
(0.02)* 
 F risk  0.19 
(0.029)* 
 
P risk   -0.08 
(0.01)* 
P risk   -0.02 
(0.016) 
TI 0.08 
(0.03)* 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
0.13 
(0.024)* 
TI 0.10 
(0.03)* 
-0.012 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.03)* 
GNS -0.03 
(0.035) 
-0.008 
(0.02) 
0.014 
(0.02) 
GNS -0.03 
(0.031) 
-0.03 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
Impor Bs 
et S 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
Impor Bs 
et S 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
0.02 
(0.025) 
0.10 
(0.05)* 
R2 
Ajusted 
0.77 0.90 0.90 R2 Ajusted 0.78 0.88 0.72 
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         The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that the effect of total rent on the equipment 
spending is significant in two models, while the impact of the oil rent is significant in 
a single model. On the other hand, the impact of total rent on operating expenses is 
significant in a single model while the impact of oil rent is not significant. 
         For the measurement of economic risk and financial risk, their effect is positive 
on spending; however, political risk seems to have a positive effect on spending in a 
single model. 
 
         The effect of investment on equipment spending is positive, gross national saving 
(GNS) is negatively correlated with equipment spending as well as operating expenses 
in most models, and Import of goods and services seems to have a significant but 
negative effect on equipment spending. 
 
Comments of the Results:  
 
         The impact of the natural rent is more important than the impact of the oil rent 
on the two components of public spending: equipment spending and operational 
expenses. Countries rich in natural resources, such as Algeria, are characterized by a 
weak rule of law, by a low quality of the legal institutions by a lower participation of 
citizens in public decision-making, by political instability, by a high level of corruption 
and absence of transparency. Find similar results in the work of Acemoglu et al. 2003; 
Mehlum et al. 2006; Isham et al. 2003; Sachs and Warner 1995; Golden and Neary 1982; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Arezki and Gylfason 2011; and Beck 2010. 
 
         But in the case of Algeria, we find that there is no proportional relationship 
between rent and expenditure. This may be due to the part of the oil revenues allocated 
to the oil stabilization fund (FRR) supplied by the difference between the tax price and 
the price of oil on the world market. This fund was established in 2000 and is intended 
to be used to control the budget deficit and smoothing the benefits of long-term 
expenses.  
 
         For variables indicating the institutional quality, the measure of the economic and 
financial risk exercises a positive effect on spending (expenses). It means that 
equipment spending and/or operational expenses increase when the economic and 
financial risk increases--in particular, the risk of liquidity, the foreign exchange risk, 
the operational risk of companies. This effect is low (weak) and could be explained by 
the weakness of the economic role of companies in the global economy of the country, 
and the almost non-existence of the financial market in Algeria. But, we can add the 
effect of the important volatility of the exchange rate dollar/euro, because the Algerian 
State denominates (draws up) its imports essentially in euro, which has a negative 
impact on public spending (expenses). On the other hand, political risk seems to have 
a positive effect on expenditures in a single model. So government expenditure 
increases when the risk of conflict, violence and terrorist activity is high (corruption 
and lower levels of democracy) (Rabah Arezki et Gylfason, 2011). 
 
         Regarding the control variables, the effect of the investment is positive, which 
implies that the increase in equipment spending is associated with an increase in 
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investments, while the effect of the investment on operational expenses is not 
significant. Gross national savings (GNS) is negatively correlated with equipment 
spending and with the operational expenses in most models. The model (3) shows a 
negative but small significance of the effect of gross national saving (GNS) on 
equipment spending. 
 
          Finally, and surprisingly, the importation of goods and services seems to have a 
significant but negative effect on equipment spending, unlike the effect on operational 
expenses which is positive in the mode l(3), for a non-productive country, which needs 
to import to satisfy domestic demand for goods and services.   
2.4. 2SLS Results and Introduction of the Interaction Term: 
 
         In this step, we use the double least square to correct the problem of endogeneity 
that can occur in the model. 
 
         One possible way of finding the causal effect from institutions on public spending 
may in this case be the use of instrumental variable technics. This possibility depends 
crucially on the validity of the instruments(s), there are a number of well-known 
studies, (such as La Porta et al. (1997), Hall and Jone s(1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson (2001), Siba (2008), Alonso et Garcimartin (2009) , Anne Boschini, Jan 
Petterson, Jesper Roine, 2012)  that have good instruments for institutions and 
successfully used them.  
 
         These instruments are clearly obvious candidates in our setting but, we cannot 
assume that they will work equally well. Having tried multiple available instruments, 
we in the end use air temperature as proxy for the latitude (The absolute distance from 
the equator), as do La Porta et. al. (1998), Brunnschweiler (2008), and Siba (2008). 
According to Hall and Jones (1999), latitude does not have a direct effect on economic 
performance, all the impact transits through an effect on institutional quality.  
 
         The latitude captured the difficulties encountered by the countries close to the 
equator, notably because of climatic and health conditions in economic development 
but also in the construction of good institutions (Landes, 1998). We also used the 
lagged variable of economic risk “e_risk (-1)” and of political risk “p_risk (-1)”. As for 
the oil rent, we used the instrument price of barrel, also the instrument reserves for the 
export of oil. 
 
        Moreover, it was interesting to add the interaction term between rent and quality 
of the institutions to see the indirect and common effect on the dependent variable. 
The interaction effect is regularly used in studies such as; Necklace and Hoeffler, 2007; 
Arezki and Gylfason, 2011, Christa N. Brunnschweiler, 2007, Anne Boschini, Jan 
Petterson, Jesper Roine, 2013, Acemoglu, et al. (2014) and others. 
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The results are presented: 
Table 7: Instrumenting for Institutions and Natural Rents; Equipment Expenditure  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Oil_rent 0.27 
(0.0005)* 
1.08 
(0.0052)* 
  
Oil_export   1.92 
(0.0015)* 
1.54 
(0.01)* 
E_risk 0.17 
(0.000)* 
 2.63 
(0.05)* 
 
F_risk    0.204 
(0.01)* 
P_risk  0.23 
(0.02)* 
  
Oil_rent*e_risk -0.005 
(0.0078)* 
   
Oil_rent*f_risk     
Oil_rent*p_risk  -0.01 
(0.007)* 
  
Oil_export*e_ris
k 
  -0.33 
(0.03)* 
 
Oil_export*f_ris
k 
   -0.24 
(0.01)* 
TI 0.08 
(0.0002)* 
 0.067 
(0.0043)* 
0.07 
(0.0017)* 
GNS -0.003 
(0.853) 
-0.02 
(0.51) 
0.01 
(0.77) 
 
Imp Bs et S -0.014 
(0.7103) 
0.09 
(0.0033)* 
-0.04 
(0.32) 
-0.04 
(0.17) 
C -3.94 
(0.000)* 
-13.90 
(0.01)* 
-15.04 
(0.0007)* 
-9.28 
(0.01)* 
Instruments  Prix_barill, 
temp 
Oil reserve, 
e_risk(-1) 
Oil reserve, 
temp 
R2 82% 62% 91% 93% 
With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses we give the probabilities.  
Source: Developed by the authors. 
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Table 8: Instrumenting for Institutions and Natural Rents; Operating Expenditures  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Oil_rent 0.76 
(0.0087)* 
 
Oil_export  0.65 
(0.0042)* 
E_risk 0.30 
(0.0024)* 
 
F_risk   
P_risk  -0.05 
(0.016)* 
Oil_rent*e_risk -0.01 
(0.0074)* 
 
Oil_rent*f_risk   
Oil_rent*p_risk   
Oil_export*e_risk   
Oil_export*f_risk   
TI 0.033 
(0.28) 
0.06 
(0.09)** 
GNS -0.041 
(0.23) 
-0.030 
(0.35) 
Imp Bs et S -0.11 
(0.24) 
0.003 
(0.95) 
C -5.93 
(0.04)* 
-4.53 
(0.010)* 
instruments Prix-barill, temp Oil reserve, p_risk(-1) 
R2 81% 84% 
With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses, we give the probabilities.  
Source: Developed by the authors. 
 
Interpretation of Results: 
 
         The results in Tables 7 and 8 show that the effect of oil rent (or oil export) on 
equipment spending or operational expenses is positively significant at 1%. This 
means that the response of public expenditure to changes in the rent follows a pro-
cyclical dynamic in the case of Algeria, which is not recommended for oil exporting 
countries because of the effect of resources to the development of the productive 
economy (counterpart), known as the resource curse, find similar results in the work 
of Rabah Arezki and Gylfason (2011). Whereas, when revenues are higher than 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 20, Issue No. 1, May 2018  
 
165 
 
expected, the rest goes towards savings rather than spending. While, when revenues 
are lower than expected, the government can draw on its financial assets.  
         Indeed, the pressure of the various social categories for rent sharing (Gylfason 
(2001), Iimi (2007), Deacon and Rode (2012) and the considerable propensity of the 
state to invest in capital during favorable economic times explains the exceptional level 
of public expenditure in Algeria. The same political distortions that are the source of 
the large volume of public spending also explain the state's current "preference for 
spending". This preference for immediate spending at its postponement prints the 
fiscal policy a procyclical dynamics (Bouklia-Hassan, 2014). 
 
         In addition to being highly volatile and procyclical, the fiscal policy response to 
shocks in oil revenues is asymmetrical. Indeed, current public expenditure is probably 
more elastic to the increase in hydrocarbon revenues than to its decrease due to the 
irreversibility, to a certain extent, of the increase in current expenditure. In contrast, 
equipment spending often finances projects that are likely unproductive "military 
designated by the term (white elephants)" or have effects that extend over the medium 
to long term and can be deferred (McMahon 1997). 
 
         Regarding the variables (Institutional Quality), equipment spending (or 
operational expenses) increase following an increase in economic risk and financial 
risk, indicates a decrease in compliance with the law, and in the role of legal 
institutions in general. This result shows that the government favors non-productive 
projects or projects with low yields (infrastructure, subsidies, wages, etc.), to conceal 
the errors committed by the authorities with the reason to avoid the conflicts and 
discontent of the population. On the other hand, political risk (preventing corruption) 
has a positive effect on equipment spending. 
 
         However, the interaction effect between rent and institutional quality measures 
is negative, indicating that the presence of rent in less democratic countries, like 
Algeria, increases expenditures (spending). This indicates that the positive public 
spending effects diminish as institutional quality improves.  So resource rents lead to 
more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries (Rabah Arezki 
and Gylfason, 2011). 
 
         Regarding the control variables, the total investment has a positive impact on 
equipment spending, while the latter has no effect on operational expenses. Imports 
of goods and services have a positive effect in one model indicating that compared to 
non-oil exports, Algeria still is in the excess situation of imports, to satisfy the needs of 
the population.  
 
         We conclude that the effect of rent and the quality of institutions on operational 
expenses is more important than the effect on equipment spending. In a country that 
favors inappropriate current and non-productive expenditures, needs to instead invest 
to improve the health, education of the population and support productive projects 
that stimulate growth. 
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3- Conclusion and Extensions  
 
         In this study, we try to identify the impact of the natural rent as well as the impact 
of institutional quality on the composition of public spending and thus select which of 
the two components, operational expenses or equipment spending react better. For 
countries rich in oil, gas or minerals, the formulation of fiscal policy can be a delicate 
exercise. 
         We found that the response of public expenditure to changes in the rent follows 
a pro-cyclical dynamic in the case of Algeria. Regarding the measure of institutional 
quality, we have chosen the most compatible measures with the other variables in the 
case of Algeria. We can introduce other measures such as the index of corruption, the 
index of governance, quality of bureaucratic...etc but it is more interesting if we use an 
approach with panel data, grouping several countries. This will allow us to make a 
comparison in terms of public expenditure management. 
         Indeed, the bad institutional quality shows that the budget procedures lack 
transparency with the presence of rent, because the benefits related to the exercise of 
power are more important in prompting politicians to manipulate the composition of 
public expenditure to maximize their probability to make decisions. 
         This assumption is argued by the positive relationship between public spending 
and the level of financial risk on the one hand and the level of economic risk on the 
other. This leaves us to ponder that spending affects the country's financial situation 
especially when these expenditures fueling infrastructure or projects with extremely 
low rates of return, referred under the term a "white elephant" (McMahon 1997). On 
the other side, the positive relationship between public spending and the extent of 
political risk shows that the current government increases expenditure to avoid 
conflicts and dissatisfaction of the population.  
        To conclude, budget transparency and good governance based on solid fiscal 
institutions should be a priority for developing countries rich in natural resources. 
Therefore, the increase in public expenditure requires first determining the destination 
and the distribution of investment. 
         To obtain more reliable results, we are going to proceed to do a study with panel 
data concerning countries with a stabilization or investment fund based on 
hydrocarbon. We try to show the behavior of each country towards the national 
savings and the management of the public spending. 
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